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bstract: Quotas, including youth quo-
tas for representative institutions, are
usually evaluated from within the so-
cial justice discourse. That discourse relies on
several questionable assumptions, seven of
which I critically address and radically revise in
this contribution from a libertarian perspec-
tive. Temporal justice then takes on an entirely
different form. It becomes a theory in which re-
sponsibilities are clear and cannot be shifted
onto the shoulders of the weak and innocent. I
shall only briefly sketch some outlines and gen-
eral implications of such a theory, arguing that
tive facts but also about actual and potential
support and resistance.2 Adequate represen-
tation can take many forms, but in a classic
typology Hanna Pitkin distinguished two
types that are definitive of a fundamental
dilemma for democracies: representation as
acting for versus representation as standing
for.3
Representation as acting for demands that
representatives defend the opinions and fur-
ther the interests of whomever it is they
 represent. While perhaps in an ideal democ-
racy, the representative can be expected to
it offers too little guidance for our imperfect
world. While that implies more tolerance for
quotas, I nevertheless propose an alternative
more suited to a representative, deliberative
democracy: veto rights.
Representation, justice, and youth 
quotas1
No political system, democratic or other,
can function successfully without some de-
gree of representative consultation, for
starters because politics must be based on
adequate information not just about objec-
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be able to act for any citizen, the real world
is obstinate and obstructive. It is unlikely
that a white, religious, healthy male octoge-
narian knows what it is like to be a black,
atheist, handicapped young female; it is also
unlikely that any member of any of the lat-
ter sociological groups would trust their rep-
resentative to be able to adequately represent
them. 
Both because of the objective obstacles the
representative faces, and because of the sub-
jective hesitations of the represented, mod-
ern democracies increasingly pay attention
to representation as standing for. On the lat-
ter view, representatives are expected to re-
flect the (relevant) sociological categories
that make up the electorate. Thus, one ex-
pects parliaments to contain percentages of
women and men, colours, creeds and edu-
cational and professional backgrounds more
or less similar to those among the popula-
tion at large. Of course, since one cannot ex-
pect a female representative to represent
emancipated women’s interests merely
 because she is female (she may well be an or-
thodox Muslim), democracies are continu-
ally trying to square the circle, hoping to
offer both adequate sociological and
ideational representation.
Both forms of representation may be empir-
ically necessary for the smooth and stable
functioning of political systems, but – to-
gether with democracy − they have also be-
come part of the normative framework of
liberal democracies. Guaranteeing adequate
representation of all relevant groups and cat-
egories in society has become a matter of jus-
tice, more specifically of distributive social
justice. And one of the most popular and
widely used instruments of justice in repre-
sentation is the institution of quotas4 –
which is ultimately the subject of this article.
Quotas are on everyone’s minds these days,
both when we select people and when we
elect them. When we, or at least the more or
less experienced administrators and politi-
cians among us, select members of a com-
mittee, we never ever pick people at random.
We select them, and we do so on the basis of
knowledge and experience, political or so-
cial interests, gender, culture, ethnicity, and
any other trait or characteristic that might
be relevant to the legitimacy and effective-
ness of the choices that the committee is ex-
pected to make. These days, it does not hap-
pen often that groups have to publicly
remind us of their exclusion with large, in-
tensive and sometimes even violent cam-
paigns like the feminist and coloured
movements of the 19th and 20th century
needed in order to be heard. As a sort of pre-
emptive strike against formal quotas, we
have become our own thought police and
have assimilated a directive demanding uni-
versally fair sociological representation as
part of our standard operating procedure.
Quotas are also on the minds of many of us
in the election booth, who, already having
picked a party, subsequently find ourselves
unable or unwilling to express a strong pref-
erence for any particular candidate. We − the
undecided − then often ask ourselves
whether we should vote for a woman, for an
academic, for someone from our home town
or region or from a particular ethnic or reli-
gious group. And sometimes we really can-
not choose. I admit that, for want of a more
sensible criterion, I once decided to vote for
the candidate most closely related to me by
family ties – a politician with whom I share
a four-times-great-grandfather. Any random
criterion, however offensive, will do when
no relevant criterion applies.
Several countries have, in recent years, in-
troduced quotas in politics. Most of these
quota rules aim to reduce the underrepre-
sentation of women in politics – in parties,
parliaments and governments – and most
are voluntary, for example where parties
agree internally to either put up a minimum
percentage of women to be elected, or re-
serve for each sex only the (un)even posi-
tions on candidate lists. Other quota rules,
again mostly voluntary, guarantee represen-
tation of particular creeds, sexual prefer-
ences, regions, native languages and
ethnicities. One of the latest additions to the
list is quotas for the youngest generations
under the banner of temporal justice.
For the sake of simplicity, I shall assume that
we are only talking about youth quotas in
parliament, although most of what I have to
say applies to other institutions as well, mu-
tatis mutandis. Even so, we are talking about
two fundamentally different youths, two dif-
ferent quotas, and two quite different forms
of temporal justice.5 One refers to intergen-
erational justice between existing generations
or age cohorts, to ensure the proper repre-
sentation of the presently young, which I
shall refer to as intergenerational justice. The
other type of quota would have to allow the
young to represent currently non- existent
future generations – I will call this justice to-
wards future generations.6
Quotas are almost always developed and
evaluated from a broadly social liberal per-
spective – as has also happened in the case of
youth quotas. That is to say, many among us
assume that societies ought to be − broadly
speaking − constitutional liberal democratic
societies, that they should have governments
controlled by representative institutions,
that governments have tasks other than de-
fence against enemies abroad. And at home,
and they, you, we, assume that there is a sort
of collectively owned hoard, a stock of re-
sources that has to be distributed over soci-
ety in a fair, just and impartial way, so as to
enable all of us to enjoy the greatest freedom
to live our lives in accordance with our own
convictions, as long as that freedom is com-
patible with a similar freedom for others –
in John Rawls’ words.7 I usually share these
convictions,8 but for the sake of academic
sincerity, one occasionally needs to take
some distance from these standard views and
adopt a more libertarian perspective on so-
ciety and politics. 
Libertarianism defends as just a society
based on and religiously respectful of volun-
tary association among consenting adults;
no other form of association can be com-
patible with respect for humans as au-
tonomous moral agents (as deontological
libertarians argue) and no other society can
as efficiently and effectively guarantee both
individual freedom and collective prosperity
(as consequentialist libertarians argue).9
There is no role for a state in libertarianism
except as a guarantor of the freedom of as-
sociation and no room for taxes except to
that purpose. Libertarians reject the idea of
social or redistributive justice as it requires
the existence (and creation) of a common
stock, and that is impossible without violat-
ing individuals’ property rights. That said, a
young branch of the libertarian tree called
left-libertarianism believes that nature is
common property, and argues that since pri-
vate property equals work mixed with re-
sources taken out of nature, a redistributable
tax to correct the deprivation of others from
natural resources can be justified.10
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Justice is indiscriminately due to all,
without regard to numbers, wealth,
or rank. 
/ John Jay /
It does not take a majority to prevail
... but rather an irate, tireless mino-
rity, keen on setting brushfires of
freedom in the minds of men. 
/ Samuel Adams /
I choose a libertarian critique of social lib-
eral thoughts over other popular schools in
political philosophy because libertarianism
comes closest to functioning as a conscience
for social liberalism. My argument will be
that, by unquestioningly adopting a social
liberal perspective in the context of tempo-
ral justice, we run the risk of importing and
overlooking several quite dubious assump-
tions. Now if the assumptions of a model are
flawed, then the standards by which we eval-
uate the desirability and permissibility of
policies and institutions will be flawed too.
In less abstract terms: if we want to know
whether or not youth quotas are a morally
good idea, we need to be sure that we meas-
ure right and wrong, just and unjust, by an
arguably legitimate standard.
I shall identify seven dubious, usually un-
seen and unquestioned assumptions – and
for brevity’s sake I shall refer to them as mis-
understandings. Some of these have to do
with intergenerational justice, some with
justice towards future generations, and some
with the way resources and the environment
are conceived of in the temporal justice dis-
courses. Having shoved these seven dwarfs
aside, we discover we are left with a perhaps
theoretically consistent, intellectually chal-
lenging and morally sincere view of tempo-
ral justice – but also one that is highly
unpractical. So I will then move on to de-
velop a more pragmatic analysis of our two-
headed sleeping beauty, youth quotas.
Seven misunderstandings about temporal
justice 
(1) The first and most important misunder-
standing in temporal justice theory is that
there must be future generations. It is very
common to assume that humanity will, in-
deed must, procreate, either because chil-
dren would be a collective or public good,
or because it is a moral and religious duty.
The command to ensure the survival of hu-
manity is, quite tellingly for our cultures, the
topic of one of the most classic flirtation
strategies and even more, it is part of the ul-
timate and most definitive rejection: “I
would not go out with you even if you were
the last human being on Earth.” In circles
more directly related to my own sub-disci-
pline, green political theory, it was Hans
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Jonas11 who effectively put justice towards
future generations, particularly environ-
mental justice, on the political agenda – and
it was also Jonas who explicitly stated that
humanity has a duty to ensure the contin-
ued existence of the species.12 The grounds
Jonas quotes for this duty remain a bit vague
but the gist of his argument is that it is a
Christian duty, a divine command implicit
in our creation.13
Most current authors in the field of tempo-
ral justice, even those working on questions
of population growth, do not take the trou-
ble to offer an argument but simply assume
that humanity must continue to exist, sim-
ply by never discussing the alternative, the
passing or fading out of humanity. Whether
or not religion has a place in a polite society,
that is a moot point – but it will be clear that
this idea has no place in a social liberal con-
text. For social liberals, there can be no re-
course to religious or other unreasonable
doctrines as foundations of the public good.
And that precludes the possibility of argu-
ing that there can be a duty to ensure the
continued existence of humanity. To whom,
after all, would we owe this duty? Let us take
a moment to consider this question seri-
ously.
First, it cannot be a duty towards future gen-
erations or future individuals themselves –
that would be a case, straight out of the
handbooks, of circular reasoning. Secondly,
it cannot be a duty towards our fellow citi-
zens either – that would make our repro-
ductive organs, our wombs and testicles
their property, to be used at their discretion
(by majority vote or government directive).
More precisely, it would make our bodies
the property of the collective, and thereby
turn us into mere tools and test tubes in the
service of an alleged common good.
Thirdly and finally, ensuring the continued
existence of humanity, a.k.a. having chil-
dren, cannot be a duty to ourselves either.
That would imply one of the most invasive
paternalistic limitations imaginable on the
individual’s freedom to formulate and exe-
cute his or her own authentic plan of life and
theory of the good. By making parenting a
necessary element of a life worth living, it
would also be an insult to, and a failure to
recognise the existence of, those who cannot
procreate – as much as those who are by law
excluded from parenthood. I mention in
that connection in particular more or less
civilised people in parts of Europe who opt
for openly supporting a truly antediluvian,
barbaric attitude towards homosexuality in
their societies.
So no duty to procreate, then. What is in-
stead consistent with a liberal worldview is
the idea that having children can be part of
an individual’s plan of life, if he or she so
chooses, and if the execution of that choice
does not harm anyone else. It follows that if
any social or political duty in relation to fu-
ture generation exists, it is a prima facie duty
towards the prospective parent: other things
being equal, we may have duties (and I will
assume that we do have those duties) to tol -
erate the wish to procreate, and to enable
him or her (the parent) to enjoy the same
 lib erties, to have the same opportunities and
means to create a new human, that we grant
to contemporary others.
(2) Moving on more rapidly and succinctly
to the second major misunderstanding in
temporal justice discourses: there is no col-
lective responsibility for future generations.
Or more precisely: any collective responsi-
bility taken on behalf of future generations
is a political convention, not a moral obli-
gation. 
This follows logically from our observation
that we have no duty to ensure the contin-
ued existence of humanity, only duties to
give individuals who want to procreate as
fair opportunity to do so as others, including
those who do not, or do not want to. There
are a couple of provisos that have to do with
duties towards the incompetent and the
abandoned. But in general, the proper lib-
eral attitude in the area of justice for future
generations should be that it is the responsi-
bility of the procreating parent or consent-
ing parents to ensure their children will have
a life worth living, and that does not even
seem to have to include the option of en-
abling them to create a third generation.
Let me next discuss three misunderstandings
that are relevant to both types of temporal
justice, misunderstandings that have to do
with environmental sustainability, or envi-
ronmental management or however you
want to call it. 
(3) Our third temporal justice misunder-
standing is to believe that, because planet
Earth is not any individual’s property, it
would therefore be the exclusive property of
humanity as a whole. Traditional libertari-
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All men have equal rights to liberty,
to their property, and to the protec-
tion of the laws. 
/ Voltaire /
Justice is not a prize tendered to 
the good-natured, nor is it to be
withheld from the ill-bred. 
/ Charles L. Aarons /
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ans stress that nature is unowned before
what is called “original acquisition”, the
 appropriation by individuals of natural
 resources with an eye to using them.14  
So-called left libertarians and virtually all
 social liberals assume that before exploita-
tion, natural resources are the collective
 property of a people, a nation, a state or the
whole of humanity.15
The difference between these two positions
is crucial: from the traditional libertarian
point of view, any act of acquisition, any in-
trusion on sovereign nature, has to be posi-
tively justified – and though admittedly the
average libertarian’s standards for justifiable
acquisition are abysmally low, they do have
standards and are not principally opposed to
raising them. 
On the collective ownership view, however,
what has to be justified is not that nature is
turned into resources but how, and for what
purpose. It is assumed beforehand that there
is a legitimate use for each and every bit of
nature – the question is how to identify a
precise legitimate purpose and legitimate
user.16 Yet social liberals offer no justification
for the primary assumption that a people or
humanity are the initial owners of nature.
The social liberal position is internally in-
consistent. Either property rights are derived
from natural law, or they are conventions. If
derived from natural law, then we must jus-
tify acquisition in broadly Lockean terms,
assuming initial non-ownership. If property
rights are based solely on convention, then
nature is by definition unowned before ap-
propriation. In either case, the onus of proof
lies with whoever intends to exploit nature.17
More down to earth, the social liberal atti-
tude towards nature does not protect nature
itself against exploitation, which implies a
bias towards turning nature into resources
now rather than later, which in turn pre-
cludes future generations from developing
other resources based on the now exploited
rather than protected bits of nature. It is this
attitude that, in the pursuit of improved
welfare for the presently worst-off and their
descendants, is for instance willing to sacri-
fice currently useless animal and plant
species.
(4) A further mistake is to assume that prop-
erty rights, private or other, necessarily in-
clude the right to destroy with impunity. A
property right to an object x is in fact a
whole series of rights – rights to use x in this
or that way, in this or that context, and to
this or that purpose; rights to delegate and
transfer, rights to mould and shape, and so
on. But none of those rights is a priori ab-
solute; they are all limited by other people’s
rights, including but not limited to property
rights in other objects. And this implies that,
while arguably the crucial difference be-
tween ownership and possession is the right
to destroy x, that right too is a priori never
unlimited. It furthermore implies that one
of those limits may be a duty to provide
compensation to those now deprived of the
public benefits of the destroyed good x.18
One typically social liberal objection to pri-
vate property, and thus one classic argument
for the legitimacy of taxation or collective
ownership and government-controlled re-
distribution, is that individual owners can
destroy their property with impunity, to the
disadvantage of the rest of humanity – say,
the owner of a gorgeous historic mansion
can tear it down and replace it with a Kool-
haas skyscraper. While laws may allow that,
morality − as we have just seen − does not
support such an automatism. In addition, if
the justification of taxation and redistribu-
tion is that private property would otherwise
be destroyed for no good reason, it seems the
same should apply to collective property –
there too we risk wanton destruction by the
owner to the disadvantage of the excluded,
such as future generations.
(5) A further mistake follows from the pre-
vious four: it is the mistake to believe that
the collective has any rights over my prop-
erty or over my use of it in relation to my
offspring. It is admittedly my duty to pro-
vide any offspring I choose to create with the
means to live a life worth living (indeed a
duty undermined by pre-emptive welfare
state interference on behalf of an unborn
collective), but anything above that is at my
discretion – I am not morally obliged to pro-
vide for my neighbour’s children, nor for my
children’s children, nor for future genera-
tions in general.
Moving on, let me now address a final
pair of mistakes specific for intergenerational
justice.
(6) The sixth mistake is to assume that there
is a special relation between intergenera-
tional justice and justice towards future gen-
erations. Hence the idea that specifically the
young would be in a good position to repre-
sent future generations, and hence quotas.
Much of the literature on temporal justice
assumes that justice between presently exist-
ing generations and justice between those
generations and the one coming after is
much the same. Those who are up and com-
 ing cannot speak for themselves but have to
be represented, but what, after all, is the real
difference between them and the 0−5 year
olds who are basically equally silent? If we
accept that the next unborn generation does
not differ in any morally significant way
from existing children, putting all further fu-
ture generations on a par with our youngest
offers no further moral challenges, only
practical ones – like how to predict their
numbers, tastes and technologies. Or so one
might think.
Yet as we have seen above, there is no duty to
create future individuals; their existence is a
choice, not a given. While we can procreate
and thereby create duties that arise at the
moment of birth, we cannot owe anything
to non-existing entities as long as we can
choose not to create them. And reversely, we
do have obligations to the existing young
and we cannot “unbirth” them.
(7) The final mistake is to assume, as many
democratic theorists seem to do these days,
that egoism − that is, representing and pro-
moting one’s own interests − is either neces-
sarily good or morally neutral. It can be, but
it need not be; it can under circumstances
also be immoral. In the context of intergen-
erational justice, of justice between existing
generations, and in defence of youth quotas
as an instrument of intergenerational justice,
we must assume egoism to be good. Quotas
are there to ensure that the interests of a po-
tentially underprivileged or underrepre-
sented cohort are protected and defended;
this cannot be justified without presuming
that it is morally good to represent and pro-
mote those interests, which is the definition
of egoism.
Now to understand democracy as the repre-
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Earth provides enough to satisfy
every man's needs, but not every
man's greed.
/ Mahatma Gandhi /
The planting of a tree, especially one
of the long-living hardwood trees, 
is a gift which you can make to
 posterity at almost no cost and with
almost no trouble, and if the tree
takes root it will far outlive the
 visible effect of any of your other
 actions, good or evil. 
/ George Orwell /
sentation of selfish interests is a very old and
respectable, or at least aristocratic and anti-
democratic, view. It dates back to Aristotle,
who actually defined democracy as mob
rule, as rule by the many in their private in-
terests rather than in the interest of the com-
munity.19 It is precisely for its pure and
undiluted promotion of egoism that
philosophers throughout the ages have al-
ways  rejected democracy, or in their most
permissive moods have sought to counter-
balance it by adding elements of rule by the
neutral, the wise or the better – as indeed
Aristotle already did. While Machiavelli was
perhaps the first to appreciate egoism neu-
trally, it took until Adam Smith to develop
a positive understanding of self-interest as
“enlightened self-interest”, the rational man’s
understanding of his best interest given the
necessities of social cooperation and of
therefore having to take others’ interests into
account as well.20
Now if we could trust the young to be this
kind of egoists, this kind of enlightened in-
dividuals who define their self-interest on
the basis of their needs as much as of those
three of four generations that will come after
them, then youth quotas will contribute to
justice for future generations. But not only is
the jury still out on whether or not they are
in empirical reality sufficiently capable of
doing this, and more capable than others –
it is also already in theory evident that the
interests of distinct generations may not al-
ways coincide. It is in fact because of such
conflicts of interests that cohort quotas have
been suggested. However, if one sees youth
quotas as a means to defend the “partial” in-
terests of one cohort against others, one can-
not at the same time task that lucky cohort
with the “impartial” defence of the interests
of another generation, existent or non-
 existent.
Libertarian temporal justice: 
orthodox and pragmatic versions
With these seven mistakes eliminated, what
room does libertarianism leave for quotas?
At first sight, one would have to say: none
whatsoever. I will analyse and defend this
first sight observation in detail momentar-
ily, but please keep in mind that first sights
are often deceptive.
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Libertarian views on temporal justice do of
course, as a matter of principle, leave little
room for state intervention. Natural re-
sources are not the state’s to distribute or re-
distribute, procreation and population
policy is not its concern, and since govern-
ment is there only to catch thieves and pro-
tect sov ereignty, a parliament’s task will be
light too. Instead, individuals have the clear,
undivided and exclusive responsibility to de-
cide on whether or not to procreate, limited
only by the obligation to ensure a life worth
living for their immediate offspring − and
limited by nothing else.
In such a world, it is obvious that quotas
have no place. They would not just be re-
dundant, they would be considered straight-
forwardly unjust, expressions of a deeply
perverted notion of morality. Two versions
of the veto on quotas exist: one is conse-
quentialist, the other deontological.
Some libertarians of the consequentialist
persuasion would argue that quotas, if effec-
tive, are instituted when the cultural battle
for recognition of an excluded group is al-
ready won, i.e., when quotas have in fact al-
ready become all but superfluous. Support
for existing quotas thus shows their political
legitimacy but not their philosophical,
moral legitimacy. The consequentialist lib-
ertarian would warn us not to commit the
democratic fallacy of believing that what a
majority believes must be true or good. It
suffices to point to the 19th century’s ma-
jority views on women’s rights, race, slavery,
etc. to reject democracy as the ultimate
source of ethics.
Quotas are also immoral, from the deonto-
logical libertarian’s point of view, for the
simple reason that any cooperative venture
should be the result of free and unrestrained
individual choices. Democratic decision-
making, majoritarianism, is nothing but dic-
tatorship or tyranny, unless and as long as a
decision is unanimously, voluntarily and in
full reason agreed to.21 A self-proclaimed
democracy, where a collective (majority)
choice can be pushed through with the sup-
port of overrepresented groups, is even more
evidently tyrannical. In a genuinely libertar-
ian society, democratic decision-making is
pre-empted by individual rights.
Now, while a libertarian perspective on tem-
poral justice is helpful, refreshing and per-
haps even liberating, the libertarian theorist’s
attitude towards quotas is also predictable,
unpractical and unhelpful – regardless of
whether it is correct or not. The problem is
that libertarianism, like utopianism, assumes
a context that does not yet exist; like Carl
Baron von Münchhausen, libertarianism has
to tear itself out of the swamp by its own
bootstraps. It offers a choice between ulti-
mate good and ultimate evil, between a per-
fect libertarian society – where autonomous
individuals know their responsibilities, take
them seriously, and respect those of their
neighbours – and every other world, each of
which would be equally unjust and oppres-
sive. Like utopianism, libertarianism offers
no guidelines for choices between the fifty
shades of grey that our evil real-existing
world offers.
I would therefore like to suggest a more
pragmatic answer to quotas, still inspired by
libertarianism, if not orthodox. I would sug-
gest that quotas for the young can be toler-
able in the context of justice between
existing generations, since they may, under
the right circumstances, limit the risk of use
and abuse of power in negotiations between
the free and autonomous individuals who
wish to enter into voluntary associations.
That would make them the lesser evil. Here,
quotas might imaginably guarantee a fair
representation of interests, and thus prevent
the construction of exploitative institutions,
that is, oppressive institutions – institutions
limiting the individual’s negative freedom.
What then is the lesser evil in temporal jus-
tice? First, as far as intergenerational justice
is concerned, we must recognise quotas for
what they are: on the one hand, vessels of
Smithian comprehensive egoism, to which
no libertarian can object; on the other hand,
an unrealistic (unrepresentative) redistribu-
tion of bargaining power. If there can be an
argument in favour of deliberately misrep-
resenting the distribution of power in soci-
ety, it cannot be an argument in favour of
youth quotas specifically – it must necessar-
ily be one in favour of any cohort or group
requiring and deserving a bit of extra power.
Perhaps that implies a permanent special
provision for those born from 1990 to 1999;
and perhaps in fifteen years those born be-
tween 1960 and 1970 will turn out to de-
serve an advantage.
The question is, of course, if there is such an
argument, a reason why a libertarian, forced
to live in a parliamentary democracy under
(from his or her point of view) the tyranny
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Whenever a separation is made 
between liberty and justice, neither,
in my opinion, is safe. 
/ Edmund Burke /
I knew, as every peasant does, that
land can never be truly owned. 
We are the keepers of the soil, the
curators of trees
/ Lisa St Aubin de Terán /
61
of social liberalism, could tolerate cohort
quotas. There may actually be one such ar-
gument, though it will only find favour in
the eyes of a very small part of the libertar-
ian tribe. A deontological libertarian might
accept skewed representation of group in-
terests if that creates a level playing field –
that is, if quotas help to protect the inalien-
able rights of autonomous individuals
against abuse of power advantages. In more
precise and therefore less legible terms, given
any starting point or baseline in negotia-
tions, quotas may counter the unproductive
effects of the involuntary creation of cir-
cumstances under which the relatively pow-
erless no longer have a viable exit option
back to the baseline.
That is not to say that youth quotas are an
obvious choice. Where justice towards fu-
ture, non-existing generations is concerned,
and remembering the distinction made ear-
lier between representation as acting for and
as standing for, it is rather quotas ensuring a
minimum representation by the elderly, or
better still the elderly without offspring, that
would be appropriate. And tied to that idea,
probably outright exclusion of the middle-
aged and young would also be defensible. If
the aim of a quota rule is to represent the au-
thentic interests of absentees, then it would
be rational to seek to remove all temptation
to deviate from the absentees’ enlightened
self-interest. Given that the interests of gen-
erations may always clash, this points be-
yond any form of representation as acting
for by potentially self-interested parties. The
most sensible candidate for representation
is, after all, he or she whose personal inter-
ests are least likely to be hurt by the repre-
sented. And that is the man or woman on
his or her way out, with no offspring to be
partial to. 
This said, the average libertarian would still
maintain that representing future genera-
tions in the process of resource distribution
is to put the horse behind the cart. Even in
a social justice-based political system, a lib-
ertarian will argue that there are better, and
more legitimate, instruments available to
protect the interests that particular groups
in society feel deserve protection. The inter-
ests of future generations are like the inter-
ests of endangered species, a beautiful land-
scape, a language, a religion or an art form:
they are private preferences. Such private
preferences can and will be defended, and
may be promoted, as long as they do not in-
fringe upon or prescribe other people’s tastes
and preferences, and the way to defend and
practise those private preferences is by the
execution of individual rights. Whoever
wants to protect a forest against develop-
ment can join forces with others, buy it and
thereby veto any development plans even if
supported by a majority; whoever wants to
protect resources in general on behalf of a
future generation or an endangered species
or any other private fancy, is free to do like-
wise.
Notes
1 This is an extended, revised and improved
version of my more informal afterword ‘Jus-
tice and Youth Quotas: Libertarian Hesita-
tions’ in: Tremmel et al. 2015.
2 Crick 2000: 17-19.
3 Pitkin 1967: 59.
4 There are alternatives, of course. For ex-
ample, for a period between uncompromis-
ing Apartheid and the post-Apartheid
regime of Mandela, South Africa’s parlia-
mentary system consisted of several separate
Chambers reserved for representatives of the
white, coloured and black populations –
based, obviously, on the Apartheid regime’s
own myopic definition of relevant sociolog-
ical categories.
5 See Juliana Bidadanure’s contribution to
Tremmel et al. 2015.
6 Only when I refer to the two together will
I use the term temporal justice.
7 Rawls 1999: 266. Other famous social lib-
eral formulations of the social justice para-
digm are Ackerman 1980; Barry 1989,
1995; Galston 1980, 1991; Miller 1999.
8 See Wissenburg 1999.
9 Famous formulations of the libertarian
credo include Narveson 2001; Nozick 1974;
Rothbard 2002, 2006; Simon 1996.
10 See e.g. Steiner 1994; Otsuka 2003; Val-
lentyne 2007.
11 Jonas 1979.
12 Jonas 1966.
13 This is the cornerstone of Hans Jonas’
(1979, 1966) arguments for justice towards
future generations, for the responsible man-
agement of nature and natural resources,
and for sustainability as a standard of re-
sponsible management. It is interesting to
note that while most social liberal defenders
of intergenerational justice acknowledge an
intellectual debt to Jonas as the source of the
idea that future generations are a given, none
acknowledge his deeply illiberal reason for
believing so: a religious duty to ensure the
continuation of the human species.
14 See e.g. Anderson / Leal 1991; Feser
2005; Miron 2010; Narveson 1998; Nozick
1974; Rothbard 2006; Scriven 1997. The
original acquisition theory goes back to John
Locke’s 1689 social contract theory (Locke
1924).
15 See note 10; see also Hale 2008.
16 See Wissenburg 2013.
17 Aside from the question which collective
(humanity, state, people, tribe, family), col-
lectives have to explain their intentions and
justify their action just like any other “legal
person”. Note also that, by implication, the
property of one dead intestate reverts to na-
ture, not by default to the state.
18 See Hadley 2005; Hale 2008; Wis-
senburg 2012.
19 Aristotle 1962: 1297a, 22-24.
20 Smith 1984.
21 And even then the deontological liber-
tarian would hesitate to accept voluntary
slavery in any form – because that is, obvi-
ously, what democracy is. For a further, con-
sequentialist critique of democracy, see
Hoppe 2011.
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